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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
verdict attributable to his negligence. 59 Since the Court of Appeals
has seen fit to ignore this possibility and to follow a restrictive statu-
tory interpretation, the burden now rests with the legislature to lib-
eralize the law.
DOLE v. Dow CHEMICAL Co.
Federal Tort Claims Act
By virtue of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 the United States
has agreed to waive its sovereign immunity361 in certain instances362
involving suits based on personal injury or property loss caused by the
negligent or wrongful act of a federal government employee. Con-
gress, however, conditioned consent to suit on the requirement that
the liability of the United States be determined in a federal district
court.363 The legislative history of the Act indicates that the denial of
state court jurisdiction over such suits was designed to protect the
Government from overly generous verdicts on the part of state court
juries.6
Pursuant to this statutory design, the United States, as third-party
defendant in Gerardi v. Brady,65 moved for an order dismissing the
complaint fied against it in the New York Supreme Court.3 66 The
parent action was brought by plaintiffs, injured as a result of a colli-
359 See, e.g., Stone v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 76 Misc. 2d 1021, 1023, 351 N.Y..2d 496,
499 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973).
360 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. (1970). For a detailed explanation of the purpose
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
861 For a discussion of the concept of sovereign immunity, see Pound, The Tort
Claims Act: Reason or History? 20 NACCA LJ. 404 (1964).
862 Immunity is waived by the United States where, in accordance with the law of
the state where the act or omission occurred, an individual would be liable. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2674 (1970).
363 See id. § 1346(b), which provides:
[iThe district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1,
1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or vrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment ....
See also United States v. Sherwood, 312 US. 584 (1941), wherein the Supreme Court stated:
The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be
sued, . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define the court'sjurisdiction to entertain the suit.
Id. at 586 (citations omitted). The United States' consent is also conditioned on the timely
commencement of the suit as provided in 28 US.C. § 2401 (1970).
364See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4, 12 (1945) (Minority Ob-
jections). In fact, actions against the United States under section 1346(b) must be tried in
the federal district courts without juries. See 28 US.C. § 2402 (1970).
865 78 Misc. 2d 11, 355 N.YS.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974) (mer.).
866 The motion was made pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2) and (7) upon the ground that
the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the third-party complaint against
the United States.
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sion between two automobiles, one owned and operated by the third-
party plaintiffs, the other by the United States. Notwithstanding
settlement between plaintiffs and the United States, plaintiffs initiated
suit against the defendants, who then sought to implead the Govern-
ment867 for a Dole contribution. Inasmuch as the Federal Tort Claims
Act has been held to vest exclusive jurisdiction under the Act in the
United States district courts,808 the Supreme Court, Kings County,
granted the motion to dismiss the third-party complaint.
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected the applicability
of United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,869 relied upon by the third-party
plaintiffs. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 370 the
United States Supreme Court, in Yellow Cab, permitted the Govern-
ment to be impleaded in a United States district court action under
the Federal Tort Claims Act,37 even though liability was to be deter-
mined under state law.8 72 The Gerardi court conceded that local sub-
stantive law governs all claims arising under the Act.373 However, it
further stated that "the law to be applied as to liability is a far cry
from the law with respect to jurisdiction . . . -374 Therefore, the
application of local law and the practical use of third-party practice
867 Jurisdiction was alleged under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2671 et seq. (1970).
368 Since section 1346(b) vests exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts, consent to
suit does not extend to actions instituted against the Government in a state court. See
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6-15 (1961); Small v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 659,
663-64 (D. Del. 1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1964). Furthermore, the United States
will not be bound by a state court's judgment. City of Pittsburgh v. United States, 359
F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1966). It has also been held that where the action was originally brought
in a state court, the district court did not acquire jurisdiction upon removal. See Gleason
v. United States, 458 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1972); Martinez v. Seaton, 285 F.2d 587 (10th Cir.
1961); McCracken v. Brown & Root, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
869 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
370 FED. R. Civ. P. 14. See 6 C. WRGHT & A. MiuMa, FEDEmAL PRACncE AND PRocEDuRE:
Civu. § 1450 (1971), for a discussion of impleaders by or against the United States under
rule 14.
371 Case law has sustained the right to implead the United States in a federal district
court as to a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See, e.g., United States v. Acord,
209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954); Skupski v. Wrestern Nay. Corp.,
113 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Newsum v. Pennsylvania R.R., 97 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
372 See note 362 supra.
873 78 Misc. 2d at 12, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 283. The third-party plaintiffs cited Cardillo v.
Marble Bldg., Inc., 142 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1955), for the proposition
that the law of liability of the state of the occurrence applies; therefore, they urged, a
state court has jurisdiction over the instant impleader because of substantive rights created
by Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
374 78 Misc. 2d at 12, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 283. The court additionally commented:
[T]here is no jurisdiction in a State court over any claim asserted against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, because Congress did not
consent that the United States may be bound by a State court's judgment ....
Id. at 13, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
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in actions brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act cannot abrogate
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court thus held that an
action in which the Government is a third-party defendant must be
litigated in a federal district court with jurisdiction conferred by the
Federal Tort Claims Act.3 7 5
The availability of third-party pleading is intended to facilitate
the consolidation of multiple claims otherwise triable only in separate
proceedings.37 6 Given the holding in Gerardi, a third-party plaintiff,
seeking initially to implead the United States, would be relegated to
a separate proceeding brought in a federal district court for contribu-
tion from the Government. The United States, however, cannot be
bound in the federal court by the state court judgment.7 7 To do so
would deprive it of its statutory right to litigate such issues as negli-
gence and contributory negligence. Thus, a trial de novo in the federal
district court would be mandated, thereby resulting in a needless
sacrifice of additional judicial time and effort.
Perhaps the solution to this dilemma lies in an amendment to
the Federal Tort Claims Act providing for a simpler procedure for
state court removal of tort actions3 78 wherein the defendants intend to
implead the Government.379 This would allow simultaneous disposi-
tion by the federal court of all claims arising out of one incident while
at the same time providing the United States with an opportunity to
defend itself in the forum contemplated by the Federal Tort Claims
Act. In view of the burden on both state and federal court calendars,
such an amendment would certainly be a welcome step toward pro-
moting judicial economy.
375 Id., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 283. Proper venue for section 1346(b) claims lies in the federal
judicial district where the plaintiff resides or where the alleged act occurred. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1402(b) (1970).
370 See City of Pittsburgh v. United States, 359 F.2d 564, 568 (3d Cir. 1966).
377 Id. at 568-69. In City of Pittsburgh, the city, having been held liable in a state
court for a tortious act, sued the United States for indemnification in a federal district
court alleging its inability to implead the United States in a state court action. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the order of the District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, which had granted the city's motion for summary judgment.
The Third Circuit held that under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States could
not be bound by a verdict of a state court jury in an action in which the Government
had never been joined as a defendant.
378 Only limited provisions for removal of actions under the Federal Tort Claims
Act are available. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1970) (tort actions against government
employees arising out of motor vehicle accidents are removable upon the Attorney Gen-
eral's certification).
379 See Note, United States as Third-Party Defendant Under Federal Tort Claims
Act: The Problem of Multiple Litigation and a Call for Statutory Reform, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 439, 450 (1967).
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